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 Abstract 
Developmental prosopagnosia is a neurodevelopmental condition characterised by difficulties 
recognising faces. Despite severe difficulties recognising facial identity, expression 
recognition is typically thought to be intact in developmental prosopagnosia; case studies 
have described individuals who are able to correctly label photographic displays of facial 
emotion, and no group differences have been reported. This pattern of deficits suggests a 
locus of impairment relatively late in the face processing stream, after the divergence of 
expression and identity analysis pathways. To date, however, there has been little attempt to 
investigate emotion recognition systematically in a large sample of developmental 
prosopagnosics using sensitive tests. In the present study, we describe three complementary 
experiments that examine emotion recognition in a sample of 17 developmental 
prosopagnosics. In Experiment 1, we investigated observers’ ability to make binary 
classifications of whole-face expression stimuli drawn from morph continua. In Experiment 
2, observers judged facial emotion using only the eye-region (the rest of the face was 
occluded). Analyses of both experiments revealed diminished ability to classify facial 
expressions in our sample of developmental prosopagnosics, relative to typical observers. 
Imprecise expression categorisation was particularly evident in those individuals exhibiting 
apperceptive profiles, associated with problems encoding facial shape accurately. Having 
split the sample of prosopagnosics into apperceptive and non-apperceptive subgroups, only 
the apperceptive prosopagnosics were impaired relative to typical observers. In our third 
experiment, we examined the ability of observers’ to classify the emotion present within 
segments of vocal affect. Despite difficulties judging facial emotion, the prosopagnosics 
exhibited excellent recognition of vocal affect. Contrary to the prevailing view, our results 
suggest that many prosopagnosics do experience difficulties classifying expressions, 
particularly those with apperceptive profiles. These individuals may have difficulties forming 
view-invariant structural descriptions at an early stage in the face processing stream, before 
identity and expression pathways diverge.  
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 1. Introduction 
Developmental prosopagnosia1 (DP) is a lifelong neurodevelopmental disorder associated 
with impaired face recognition, thought to affect as many as one in every 50 people 
(Kennerknecht et al., 2006; Kennerknecht, Ho, & Wong, 2008). Individuals with DP exhibit 
deficits recognising personally familiar faces as well as problems discriminating unfamiliar 
faces, despite normal intelligence, typical low-level vision, and an absence of manifest brain 
injury (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b; Susilo & Duchaine, 
2013). Due to characteristic problems with face recognition, individuals with DP often utilise 
cues derived from hairstyle, voice, and gait, for person recognition. Nevertheless, recognising 
familiar people encountered out of context or following changes in external appearance, can 
prove challenging (Shah, Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015).  
 
The precise origin of the face recognition deficits seen in DP remains unclear. Cognitive 
accounts have argued that, relative to typically developing (TD) individuals, DPs exhibit 
reduced holistic processing of faces – whereby individual features (eyes, nose, mouth) are 
integrated into a coherent unified whole – compromising the accuracy and efficiency of their 
face recognition (Avidan, Tanzer, & Behrmann, 2011; Liu & Behrmann, 2014; Palermo et 
al., 2011). At the neurological level, differences in cortical structure (Behrmann, Avidan, 
Gao, & Black, 2007; Garrido et al., 2009), structural (Gomez et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 
2009) and functional connectivity (Avidan & Behrmann, 2009; Avidan et al., 2013) have 
been observed in inferotemporal regions including the fusiform gyrus, a region thought to be 
crucial for face processing (Kanwisher, 2000). Strikingly, DP often runs in families 
(Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007; Johnen et al., 2014; Lee, Duchaine, Wilson, & 
Nakayama, 2010; Schmalzl, Palermo, & Coltheart, 2008), suggestive of a genetic component.  
 
The characteristic deficits of facial identity recognition seen in DP have attracted substantial 
research attention (Susilo & Duchaine, 2013). However, there has also been considerable 
interest in the expression recognition abilities of individuals with DP. The facial expressions 
of others are a rich source of social information, conveying cues to affective and mental states 
(Adolphs, 2002; Frith, 2009; Parkinson, 2005). The ability to interpret facial expressions 
correctly is therefore important for fluent social interaction and wider socio-cognitive 
development. Moreover, the question of emotion recognition in DP also has important 
implications for neurocognitive accounts of the condition (Bate & Bennetts, 2015; Kress & 
Daum, 2003a). Where observed together, difficulties recognising facial identity and facial 
 emotion are suggestive of apperceptive prosopagnosia (De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi, & 
Nichelli, 1991); difficulties may arise early on in the face processing stream, leaving 
observers unable to form an accurate, view-invariant description of face shape (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). Alternatively, intact expression 
recognition despite impaired recognition of facial identity suggests a locus of impairment 
relatively late in the face processing stream, after the divergence of expression and identity 
analysis pathways (Bruce & Young, 1986; Duchaine, Parker, & Nakayama, 2003; Haxby et 
al., 2000). 
 
Presently, difficulties recognising facial expressions are thought to be relatively uncommon 
in DP. Palermo et al. (2011) examined the performance of twelve DPs on three emotion 
recognition tests: The Ekman 60 Faces Test, in which participants label 60 greyscale images 
of prototypical basic emotions (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002); The 
Emotion Hexagon Test, in which participants label expressions drawn from morph continua 
constructed from the six basic emotions2 (Young et al., 2002); and The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test, in which participants identify subtle social emotions from cues present around 
the eye region (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). Strikingly, the 
twelve DPs were unimpaired at both the group and single-case level, relative to aged-matched 
controls, on all three tasks (Palermo et al., 2011). Dobel, Bölte, Aicher & Schweinberger 
(2007) described intact emotion recognition in six DPs, having administered the Tübingen 
Affect Battery – a 4 alternative-forced-choice (AFC) emotion labelling task. Similar findings 
were reported by Humphreys, Avidan and Behrman (2007), having administered The 
Emotion Hexagon Test to three DPs2, and Lee, Wilson, Duchaine and Nakayama (2010), 
having tested  three DPs using The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and a 3AFC match-to-
sample task. Several further studies of single cases have described intact emotion recognition 
in DP (Bentin, Degutis, D'Esposito, & Robertson, 2007; Duchaine et al., 2003; Kress & 
Daum, 2003b; Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 2001). Moreover, a study of four DPs indicated that 
they made typical judgements of facial trustworthiness (Todorov & Duchaine, 2008), an 
inference thought to be mediated by subtle emotion cues.    
 
Nevertheless, many DPs report problems recognising facial expressions in their daily lives 
(e.g. Lee et al., 2010), and case studies have described individuals with DP, who do exhibit 
deficits of expression recognition (Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; De Haan & Campbell, 1991; 
 Duchaine, Murray, Turner, White, & Garrido, 2009; Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth, & 
Nakayama, 2006; Minnebusch, Suchan, Ramon, & Daum, 2007; Schmalzl et al., 2008). For 
example, Duchaine et al. (2006) described a 53-year-old male DP, Edward, who exhibited 
clear expression recognition impairments on The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and on a 
3-AFC match-to-sample task. Similarly, De Haan and Campbell (1991) tested AB, the 
original case of DP first described by McConachie (1976), and found that as an adult she 
exhibited problems labelling prototypical basic emotions. Importantly, however, these reports 
are relatively infrequent (regarded as ‘the exception’ rather than ‘the norm’), and no 
systematic investigation has found evidence for a group difference.  
 
The present study sought to re-examine the expression recognition abilities of individuals 
with DP. As discussed above, this question offers critical insight into the locus of the 
perceptual difficulties seen in this condition. In particular, we sought to test systematically a 
large sample of DPs using sensitive tests. The ability of different tests to detect emotion 
recognition deficits varies widely. For example, Edward, the DP described by Duchaine et al. 
(2006), was substantially impaired on The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (4.1 standard 
deviations below the TD mean), but only mildly impaired on The Emotion Hexagon Test (1.4 
standard deviations below the TD mean). In Experiment 1, we investigated observers’ ability 
to make binary classifications of whole-face expression stimuli drawn from morph continua. 
In Experiment 2 observers judged facial emotion using only the eye-region (the rest of the 
face was occluded). In our third experiment, we examined the ability of observers’ to classify 
the emotion present within segments of vocal affect. 
 
2. Neuropsychological testing  
A group of 17 (11 females) individuals with DP participated in the study (Table 1). DP 
participants were recruited through www.troublewithfaces.org. All members of the DP 
sample described lifelong face recognition problems. None of the DPs had a history of brain 
injury or psychiatric disorder (e.g., Schizophrenia, Autism Spectrum Disorder). Convergent 
diagnostic evidence for the presence of DP was collected using the Cambridge Face Memory 
Test (CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a), the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT; 
Duchaine, Germine, & Nakayama, 2007) and the Twenty-Item Prosopagnosia Index 
questionnaire (PI20; Shah, Gaule, Sowden et al., 2015). When administered in the upright 
orientation, performance on the CFMT correlated closely with scores on the CFPT (r = -.73, 
p < .001) and the PI20 (r = -.82, p < .001). There was also strong correlations between the 
 PI20 and the CFPT (r = .61, p < .001). The prosopagnosics’ scores on the CFMT and CFPT 
were compared with a comparison group of 35 age- and gender-matched TD controls. All but 
one of the DPs scored at least two standard deviations below the control mean on the CFMT 
(the remaining DP participant was 1.77 standard deviations below the TD mean). In addition 
to the face recognition tests, participants completed the Cambridge Car Memory Test 
(CCMT; Dennett et al., 2011) and the Cambridge Bicycle Memory Test (CBMT; Dalrymple, 
Garrido, & Duchaine, 2014) to assess their wider object recognition ability. In addition, the 
DPs were screened for colour blindness using Ishihara’s Tests for Colour-deficiency 
(Ishihara, 1993). 
 
Table-1 
 
3. Experiment 1 
Measuring individual differences in expression recognition ability is not straight-forward. In 
particular, tasks that require participants to label prototypical emotional expressions (e.g., 
happy, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise) may lack sensitivity due to ceiling effects or 
noise introduced by differences in guessing base-rates (Ipser & Cook, 2015). In our first 
experiment we sought to determine whether DPs are impaired at making binary 
categorisations of whole-face emotional expression stimuli drawn from morph continua. 
Psychophysical modelling of categorisation probability yields sensitive and reliable estimates 
of expression recognition ability. Previous studies suggest that this approach can reveal group 
effects that may go undetected by simple labelling paradigms (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 
2013). Should individuals with DP exhibit subtle expression recognition deficits, we reasoned 
that a psychophysical approach may be most likely to reveal these problems.  
 
3.1 Methods 
The performance of the DPs was compared with a group of 23 TD controls (6 males; Mage = 
42.65, SDage = 13.44). All TD participants were screened for DP (Table 2). All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Ethical clearance was granted by the local 
ethics committee and the study was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines laid down in 
the 6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave informed consent. 
 
Table-2 
 
 Three morph continua (happiness-anger, disgust-sadness, fear-surprise) were produced by 
blending incrementally two greyscale photographs of emotional facial expressions, produced 
by a single actor, selected from Ekman and Friesen’s (1975) Pictures of Facial Affect. Image 
morphing was performed using Morpheus Photo Morpher Version 3.11 (Morpheus Software, 
Indianapolis, IN). Each continuum consisted of seven stimuli which varied in emotion 
intensity between 20% and 80% in equidistant 10% increments. Stimuli were cropped to 
exclude external features (e.g., ears, hairline) and presented in greyscale (Figure 1a).  
 
Participants completed a computer-based task written in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, 
MA) using Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Experimental trials 
presented a single image centrally for 1200 ms. Each stimulus subtended approximately 6.5° 
× 4.0° of visual angle when viewed at 60 cm. Following stimulus offset, participants were 
asked to make a binary categorisation about the stimulus image (e.g., happiness or anger?). 
Each of the 21 expression stimuli (3 continua × 7 levels of morph intensity) was presented 20 
times in a randomised order. Participants completed 6 practice trials before starting the 
experimental task. No feedback was provided during the practice or experimental procedures.  
In total, the procedure consisted of 420 trials and took approximately 20-25 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Participants’ responses were modelled by fitting cumulative Gaussian functions to estimate 
separate psychometric functions for the three continua. Function fitting was carried out in 
MATLAB using the Palamedes Toolbox (Prins & Kingdom, 2009). The key parameter of 
interest, inferred from the psychometric function, was the estimate of categorisation 
threshold. The threshold estimate is a measure of the precision with which stimuli are 
categorized and was defined as the standard deviation of the symmetric Gaussian distribution 
underlying each cumulative Gaussian function (subject to a log transform to attenuate 
positive skewing). Threshold estimates are inversely related to the slope of the psychometric 
function; steep and shallow slopes are associated with low and high threshold estimates, 
respectively. Lower threshold estimates indicate that observers can perceive subtle 
differences in stimulus strength and vary their responses accordingly. Higher threshold 
estimates reveal that participants’ responses are relatively invariant to physical changes in 
stimulus strength, indicative of imprecise categorization. 
 
Figure-1 
  
 
3.2 Results and discussion 
The threshold estimates obtained for the DP and TD groups are shown in Figure 1b. 
Threshold estimates were analysed using ANOVA with Continuum (happiness-anger, 
disgust-sadness, fear-surprise) as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD, DP) as a between-
subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of Continuum [F(1.46, 55.35) = 46.68, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .55]. Contrasts indicated that fear-surprise categorisations were associated with 
higher thresholds (M = 2.81, SD = .58) than happiness-anger (M = 1.59, SD = .87) [t(39) = 
8.15, p < .001] and disgust-sadness (M = 2.33, SD = .48) categorisations [t(39) = 5.74, p < 
.001]. Disgust-sadness categorisations were also associated with higher thresholds than 
happiness-anger categorisations [t(39) = 5.25, p < .001]. Crucially, the analysis also revealed 
a main effect of Group [F(1,38) = 4.19, p = .04, ηp2 = .10]. Collapsing across the three 
continua, the DPs exhibited higher thresholds (M = 7.26, SD = 1.54) than the TD controls (M 
= 6.36, SD = 1.24). No Continuum × Group interaction was observed [F(1.46, 55.35) = 1.02,  
p = .33, ηp2 = .03]. However, simple contrasts indicated a significant difference between the 
groups only in their fear-surprise thresholds, where the thresholds of the DP group (M = 3.11, 
SD = .69) were higher than those of the controls (M = 2.59, SD = .37) [t(38) = 3.07, p = .004]. 
Eight of the DPs scored at least one SD below the TD mean, and three (M3, F5, F11) were 
significantly impaired at single-case level (Figure 2a).  
 
Figure-2 
 
Clear correlations were observed between participants’ categorisation thresholds for the fear-
surprise continuum and their CFMT (r = -.57, p < .001) and PI20 (r = .51, p = .001) scores. 
Crucially, no significant correlations were observed with the CCMT (r = .00, p = .98) and the 
CBMT (r = -.03, p = .88) scores (Table 3). However, a striking correlation was found 
between participants’ fear-surprise thresholds and their performance on the CFPT (r = .78, p 
<.001; Figure 1c). To investigate this relationship further, the DP sample was split into two 
sub-groups based on their performance on the CFPT. Eight DPs who scored at least two 
standard deviations below the control mean on the CFPT (Table 1), and the remaining nine 
DPs, were categorised as apperceptive and non-apperceptive, respectively. Simple contrasts 
revealed a significant difference in fear-surprise categorisation thresholds between the 
 apperceptive subgroup (M = 3.54, SD = .73) and TD controls (M = 2.59, SD = .37) [t(29) = 
4.8, p < .001]. Interestingly, however, the fear-surprise categorisation thresholds of the non-
apperceptive subgroup (M = 2.72, SD = .33) did not differ significantly from the TD sample 
[t(30) = .95, p = .35].  
 
Table-3 
 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that our emotion categorisation task and the CFPT may 
tap very similar processes. The CFPT requires participants to rank order test faces according 
to their resemblance to a target face. Because the test and target faces are presented 
throughout each trial, the test is thought to measure observers’ ability to form perceptual 
descriptions of faces, under conditions of minimal working memory load. However, because 
the physical differences between test faces are subtle, the CFPT provides a demanding test of 
observers’ face encoding. Where perceptual descriptions are compromised, observers may be 
left unable to detect and interpret subtle physical differences between stimuli, resulting in i) 
poor sorting performance on the CFPT and ii) judgements of expressions that vary less 
closely with physical stimulus changes.  
 
4. Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that relative to TD controls, individuals with DP are less 
able to categorise whole-face expression stimuli drawn from continua that morph emotional 
facial expressions. While our analyses suggest a trend for less precise categorisation overall, 
difficulties were particularly clear when observers were required to detect the subtle physical 
differences between stimuli drawn from the fear-surprise continuum. At least two accounts 
may be advanced to explain the group difference observed in Experiment 1. First, difficulties 
integrating information from disparate facial regions may prevent observers with DP forming 
unified perceptual descriptions of facial expressions. Consistent with this possibility, some 
observers with DP exhibit reduced composite interference for facial expressions (Palermo et 
al., 2011), suggestive of reduced holistic processing of facial emotion. Second, observers 
with DP may have a fundamental difficulty encoding the shape of local facial features. For 
example, cases of acquired prosopagnosia have been described who appear to have particular 
problems using information from around the eye region to discriminate (Bukach, Le Grand, 
Kaiser, Bub, & Tanaka, 2008) and recognise (Caldara et al., 2005) facial identities. 
 Interestingly, problems using cues from the eye-region are thought to be associated with 
particular problems recognising facial expressions of fear (Adolphs et al., 2005).   
 
In Experiment 2 we sought to distinguish these rival explanations by examining participants’ 
ability to judge facial emotion using cues from the eye-region alone (i.e., a local region), 
using a variant of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). If the 
impairments observed in Experiment 1 arise from diminished integration of information from 
disparate facial regions, we reasoned that the DP group should perform typically on a task 
that does not require whole-face processing. However, if the impairment in emotion 
recognition is due to difficulties encoding the shape of local features, the group difference 
should still be evident.  
 
4.1 Methods 
The performance of the DPs was compared with a group of 23 TD controls (7 males; Mage = 
44.26, SDage = 13.59). All TD participants were screened for DP (Table 2). All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Ethical clearance was granted by the local 
ethics committee and the study was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines laid down in 
the 6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave informed consent. 
 
The original Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test requires observers to recognise complex 
‘social emotions’ (e.g., concerned vs. unconcerned, sympathetic vs. unsympathetic), and may 
therefore tax both mentalizing and perceptual processes. To minimize any mentalizing 
demands, our novel variant included different exemplars of four commonly encountered 
facial emotions. Stimuli were constructed from six Caucasian identities (3 females) selected 
from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). For each identity, we produced four 
morph continua by blending images of the actor exhibiting a neutral expression, with images 
of the same actor expressing happiness, anger, fear and sadness3. The expression morphs 
containing 30%, 50% and 70% of each emotion (corresponding to low, moderate and high 
intensity) were cropped so that only the eye-region was visible, and presented in greyscale 
(Figure 3a). The position of the eyes in the resulting 72 images (6 identities × 4 emotions × 3 
levels of emotion intensity) was standardised to ensure similar cues were available in each 
stimulus. Stimulus images subtended approximately 2.5° × 6.5° of visual angle when viewed 
at 60 cm.  
 
 Experimental trials presented a single stimulus centrally for 1200 ms, followed by a prompt 
to make a 4-AFC response (happiness, anger, fear, or sadness). The 72 stimuli were presented 
three times each, in a randomised order, yielding a total of 216 trials. The experiment was 
preceded by 6 practice trials. No feedback was provided during the practice or experimental 
procedures. The task lasted approximately 20 minutes. The experimental program was 
written in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
 
Figure-3 
 
4.2 Results and discussion 
The performance (% correct responses) of the DP and TD groups in the three intensity 
conditions is depicted in Figure 3b. Results were analysed using ANOVA with Intensity 
(30%, 50%, 70%) as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD, DP) as a between-subjects 
factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of Intensity [F(2,74) = 453.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .92]. 
Accuracy scores were lower in the 30% (low intensity) condition (M = .47, SD = .07) than in 
the 50% (moderate intensity) (M = .69, SD = .10) [t(38) = 18.39, p < .001] and 70% (high 
intensity) conditions (M = .80, SD = .08) [t(38) = 27.20, p < .001]. The 50% condition was 
also harder than the 70% condition [t(38) = 10.60, p < .001]. The analysis also revealed a 
main effect of Group [F(1,37) = 6.49, p = .01, ηp2 = .15], indicating that the DP group (M = 
.62, SD = .07) correctly identified fewer emotions than the TD group (M = .68, SD = .06), 
when performance was collapsed across emotion intensity. Interestingly, however, Intensity 
interacted significantly with Group [F(2,74) = 4.43, p = .01, ηp2 = .12]. Simple contrasts 
indicated that the TD group (M = .82, SD = .05) outperformed the DP group (M = .77, SD = 
.09) in the 70% condition [t(37) = 2.04 , p = .04]. A similar difference was seen between the 
DP (M = .64, SD = .09) and TD (M = .73, SD = .08) groups for the 50% condition [t(37) = 
3.24 , p = .003], but not for the 30% condition [t(37) = 1.14, p = .26]. Eight of the DPs scored 
at least one SD below the TD mean, and three (M1, M3, F10) were significantly impaired at 
single-case level (Figure 2b).  
 
Significant correlations were found between participants’ overall performance (collapsing 
across Group and Intensity) and their scores on the PI20 (r = -.48, p = .003), the CFMT (r = 
.48, p = .002) and the CFPT (r = -.58, p < .001). However, no significant correlations were 
observed with the CCMT (r = -.02, p = .93) and the CBMT (r = .11, p = .54) (Table 4). Once 
again, the DP sample was split into apperceptive and non-apperceptive sub-groups based on 
their performance on the CFPT. Simple contrasts revealed a significant difference in emotion 
 recognition ability of the apperceptive subgroup (M = .60, SD = .09) and TD controls (M = 
.68, SD = .06) [t(28) = 2.74, p = .01]. Interestingly, however, the performance of the non-
apperceptive subgroup (M = .64, SD = .06) did not differ significantly from the TD sample 
[t(29) = 1.48, p = .15]. The inability of the apperceptive DPs to judge facial emotion using 
cues from the eye-region alone does not appear to be a product of diminished integration of 
information from the eye and mouth regions (Palermo et al., 2011), or to a strategic failure to 
use information from the eye region (Adolphs et al., 2005). 
 
Table-4 
 
5. Experiment 3 
The results of the first two experiments indicate that DP individuals are less able to categorise 
ambiguous facial expressions than TD controls. In Experiment 3 we sought to determine 
whether this affect recognition deficit was specific to faces, or whether these difficulties 
extend to other domains. Crucially, aberrant limbic functionality may leave observers unable 
to interpret emotion per se (Calder & Young, 2005). For example, individuals with 
developmental alexithymia – a neurodevelopmental condition associated with problems 
interpreting emotional experiences and other forms of interoceptive sensation (Bird & Cook, 
2013; Brewer, Happe, Cook, & Bird, 2015) – exhibit a range of emotion recognition 
difficulties, including problems categorizing facial (Cook et al., 2013), vocal (Heaton et al., 
2012), and musical affect (Allen, Davis, & Hill, 2012). To determine whether DPs exhibit 
face-specific emotion recognition difficulties, we examined their ability to recognise vocal 
affect. Typical performance on this task would suggest that the poor categorisation exhibited 
by the DP group in the first two experiments is a product of face, not emotion, perception 
deficits. 
 
5.1 Methods  
The performance of the DPs was compared with a group of 22 TD controls (8 males; Mage = 
42.86, SDage = 12.89). All TD participants were screened for DP (Table 2). All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal hearing. Ethical clearance was granted by the local ethics 
committee and the study was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines laid down in the 6th 
(2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave informed consent. All participants 
spoke English as first language.  
 
 The stimuli employed in Experiment 3 were short (< 3000 ms) audio sequences of British 
actors (2 males, 2 females) uttering 3-digit numbers (“two-hundred-and-fifty-five” and “five-
hundred-and-twenty-eight”) with different emotional inflections (happiness, disgust, fear, 
sadness, anger and surprise). Stimuli were recorded in a soundproof studio. Having cropped 
the audio files, and removed background noise using Audacity sound-editing software 
(http://audacity.sourceforge.net/), stimuli were validated in an online rating study. To create 
exemplars with varying degrees of ambiguity, we sought to manipulate the pitch of the 
stimuli, a vital component of vocal affect (e.g., Scherer, 1986). Different amounts (0%, 30%, 
60%; corresponding to low, moderate and high noise) of jitter – variability in pitch over the 
course of the sound – were added to the audio tracks using the ‘Raspiness’ function in Praat 
(Boersma & Weenink, 2015). In total, 144 stimuli were employed (2 exemplars × 6 emotions 
× 4 actors × 3 levels of degradation). 
 
Experimental trials presented a single audio clip, followed by a prompt to make a 6-AFC 
response (happiness, anger, disgust, fear, sadness, or surprise).  Each stimulus was presented 
once, in a randomised order, yielding a total of 144 trials. The task lasted approximately 15 
minutes. Twelve practice trials (all with 0% jitter) preceded the experimental procedure to 
help familiarise participants with the actors’ voices. No feedback was provided during the 
practice or experimental procedures. The experimental program was written in MATLAB 
using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
 
5.2 Results and discussion 
The performance (% correct responses) of the DP and TD groups was analysed using 
ANOVA with Jitter (0%, 30%, 60%) as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD, DP) as a 
between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of Jitter [F(2,74) = 13.04, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .26]. As expected, greater pitch degradation was associated with poorer 
recognition: Accuracy scores were lower in the 60% (high noise) condition (M = .61, SD = 
.09) than in the 30% (moderate noise) (M = .65, SD = .10) [t(38) = 3.21, p = .003] and 0% 
(low noise) conditions (M = .68, SD = .09) [t(38) = 4.95, p < .001]. The 30% condition was 
also harder than the 0% condition [t(38) = 2.29, p = .03]. Crucially, however, we observed no 
main effect of Group [F(1,37) = 1.90, p = .18, ηp2 = .05], nor a Group × Jitter interaction 
[F(2,74) = .99, p = .38, ηp2 = .03], indicative of similar recognition accuracy in the TD and 
DP groups.  
 
 These results support the view that the emotion recognition difficulties exhibited by the DP 
group in the first two experiments are face-specific, and are not indicative of broader emotion 
processing impairments. The ability of the DP sample to interpret vocal signals accurately 
accords with anecdotal evidence that DPs often recognise familiar others using their voice 
(e.g., Cook & Biotti, 2016). We note, however, that recognition of vocal identity and vocal 
affect are thought to dissociate; for example, cases of developmental phonagnosia have been 
described who appear to exhibit broadly intact recognition of vocal affect, despite striking 
difficulties recognising vocal affect (Garrido et al., 2009).  
 
Discussion 
Despite severe difficulties recognising facial identity, emotion recognition deficits are 
thought to be relatively uncommon in DP (Bate & Bennetts, 2015; Humphreys et al., 2007; 
Palermo et al., 2011). Contrary to this view, however, we find evidence for widespread 
deficits in this population. In Experiment 1 we tested observers’ ability to make binary 
classifications of whole-face expression stimuli drawn from morph continua. Psychophysical 
analyses revealed diminished ability to classify morphed facial expressions in our sample of 
DPs, relative to TD observers. We replicated this group difference in Experiment 2 when 
observers categorised facial emotion using only the eye-region. In our third experiment, we 
examined the ability of observers to classify the emotion present within segments of speech. 
Despite their difficulties judging facial emotion, the prosopagnosics exhibited excellent 
recognition of vocal affect, suggestive of a face-specific difficulty.  
 
In our first two experiments, we observed striking correlations between expression 
classification accuracy and performance on the CFPT (Duchaine et al., 2007). The CFPT is 
thought to provide a demanding test of face encoding - observers’ ability to represent and 
discriminate facial shape - in the absence of substantial demands on visual memory. Poor 
performance on this test is suggestive of an apperceptive form of prosopagnosia (Dalrymple, 
Garrido et al., 2014; Duchaine et al., 2007; Shah, Gaule, Gaigg, Bird, & Cook, 2015). 
Strikingly, when the DP sample was split into apperceptive and non-apperceptive subgroups 
based on CFPT performance, only the apperceptive subgroup exhibited impaired recognition 
of facial emotion. DPs with an apperceptive profile may have difficulties forming view-
invariant structural descriptions of faces at an early stage in the face processing stream, 
before the divergence of identity and expression processing (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et 
 al., 2000). Inaccurate descriptions of local feature shape may result in imprecise expression 
categorisation as well as severe problems recognising facial identity. 
 
To our knowledge, these findings are the first evidence of impaired recognition of facial 
emotion in DP, at the group level. Importantly, our results suggest that the ability to detect 
emotion recognition difficulties in this population may be extremely sensitive to the 
procedure used. In our first experiment, the clearest group difference was observed when 
observers were required to categorise expressions containing different degrees of surprise and 
fear. Typical observers also found these categorisations more demanding, and the increased 
difficulty may be responsible for the clear group difference observed. Alternatively, DPs with 
an apperceptive profile may have particular problems encoding the shape of the eye-region, 
variation crucial for distinguishing emotions, notably fear and surprise (Adolphs et al., 2005). 
In our second experiment, a clear group difference was observed only when judging the eye-
region stimuli containing intermediate emotion intensities. All three levels of emotion 
intensity (30%, 50%, 70%) yielded recognition performance comfortably above chance 
(floor) and below 100% (ceiling) when typical observers were tested. However, stimuli either 
side of the 50% ‘sweet-spot’ may i) contain sufficiently obvious cues to be detected by 
observers with apperceptive deficits, or ii) be difficult for some typical observers to 
categorise reliably.  
 
In light of these results, we recommend that authors demand a high standard of evidence 
before concluding that cases of DP exhibit intact emotion recognition. With respect to 
methodology, task sensitivity is a crucial issue. Modelling the categorisation of stimuli drawn 
from morph continua, by fitting psychometric functions, offers a precise means to estimate 
perceptual sensitivity independently of response bias4. Where morph continua are employed, 
the use of 7 levels of stimulus intensity affords greater sensitivity than the 5 stimulus levels 
present in the ‘morph hexagon’ used previously (Humprhreys et al., 2007; Palermo et al., 
2011). The use of shorter presentation durations and ambiguous expression stimuli may have 
also increased sensitivity in the present study. With respect to sample size and composition, it 
is important that group studies have sufficient power to detect impairments. As awareness of 
DP increases, it should be easier to run group designs with reasonable sample sizes. Our 
results also suggest that studies with larger numbers of apperceptive DPs may be more likely 
to find expression recognition deficits. Where samples include relatively few DPs with an 
apperceptive profile, authors may consider qualifying their conclusions accordingly.  
  
Problems recognising facial identity – the defining feature of DP – can impact substantially 
on the social development and behaviour of sufferers. DPs often avoid social situations 
experiencing feelings of guilt and shame about actual or imagined offense caused to others 
(Davis et al., 2011). Long-term consequences can include reduced social circle, loss of self-
confidence and limited work opportunities (Dalrymple, Fletcher et al., 2014; Fine, 2012; 
Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). In severe cases, DP can also 
contribute to the development of depression and anxiety (Yardley et al., 2008). Where 
observed, problems recognising the expressions of interactants will likely exacerbate these 
difficulties. Reduced ability to detect the emotional and mental states of others may prevent 
DPs responding appropriately and hinder social interaction, particularly in situations where 
vocal cues are unavailable. At present relatively little is known about the impact of DP during 
childhood (Dalrymple, Corrow, Yonas, & Duchaine, 2013). The present results suggest the 
possibility that reasoning about the mental states of others (‘theory of mind’) may sometimes 
develop atypically in DP.    
 
In summary, having tested a group of 17 DPs on complementary emotion recognition tasks, 
we find evidence of widespread difficulties recognising facial affect. These findings are 
contrary to the view that emotion recognition deficits are relatively uncommon in this 
population (Humphreys et al., 2007; Palermo et al., 2011). Deficits were apparent when 
observers were asked to categorise emotion using cues from the whole-face or from the eye-
region only, and thus do not appear to reflect diminished integration of information from 
disparate facial regions (i.e., aberrant holistic processing). Instead, individuals with 
apperceptive forms of DP appear to have difficulties encoding facial shape, at an early stage 
in the face processing stream, before the divergence of identity and expression pathways. 
More broadly, these findings serve to illustrate how existing theoretical frameworks can be 
used to make sense of the heterogeneity seen in this population. 
 
  
 Footnotes 
1 We use the term Developmental Prosopagnosia in preference to Congenital Prosopagnosia 
to reflect the possibility that the condition emerges during development, and may not 
necessarily be present from birth.  
2 While expression stimuli were drawn from morph continua, psychophysical analyses were 
not employed (e.g., psychometric functions were not estimated). The authors’ analysis was 
restricted to proportions of correct responses, defined through reference to the dominant 
emotion signal present in each stimulus.    
3 Pilot testing of a 6-AFC procedure (happiness, anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and surprise) 
revealed that typical participants were unable to reliably distinguish i) angry and disgusted 
eyes, and ii) fearful and surprised eyes. One expression in each of the two problematic pairs 
was therefore dropped (i.e., disgust and surprise). 
4 In previous studies employing the morph hexagon, the authors have selected particular 
levels and analysed % correct. Fitting psychometric functions may yield more accurate 
measures of perceptual precision that allow for individual differences in response bias. 
  
 References 
Adolphs, R. (2002). Recognizing emotion from facial expressions: psychological and 
neurological mechanisms. Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 1(1), 21-
62. 
Adolphs, R., Gosselin, F., Buchanan, T. W., Tranel, D., Schyns, P., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). 
A mechanism for impaired fear recognition after amygdala damage. Nature, 
433(7021), 68-72. 
Allen, R., Davis, R., & Hill, E. (2012). The effects of autism and alexithymia on 
physiological and verbal responsiveness to music. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 43(2), 432-444. 
Ariel, R., & Sadeh, M. (1996). Congenital visual agnosia and prosopagnosia in a child: a case 
report. Cortex, 32(2), 221-240. 
Avidan, G., & Behrmann, M. (2009). Functional MRI reveals compromised neural integrity 
of the face processing network in congenital prosopagnosia. Current Biology, 19(13), 
1146-1150. 
Avidan, G., Tanzer, M., & Behrmann, M. (2011). Impaired holistic processing in congenital 
prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 49(9), 2541-2552. 
Avidan, G., Tanzer, M., Hadj-Bouziane, F., Liu, N., Ungerleider, L. G., & Behrmann, M. 
(2013). Selective dissociation between core and extended regions of the face 
processing network in congenital prosopagnosia. Cerebral Cortex, 24(6), 1565-1578. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The "Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes" test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with 
Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 42(2), 241-251. 
Bate, S., & Bennetts, R. (2015). The independence of expression and identity in face-
processing: evidence from neuropsychological case studies. Frontiers in Psychology, 
6(770), 1-7. 
Behrmann, M., & Avidan, G. (2005). Congenital prosopagnosia: face-blind from birth. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 180-187. 
Behrmann, M., Avidan, G., Gao, F., & Black, S. (2007). Structural imaging reveals 
anatomical alterations in inferotemporal cortex in congential prosopagnosia. Cerebral 
Cortex, 17(10), 2354-2363. 
Bentin, S., Degutis, J. M., D'Esposito, M., & Robertson, L. C. (2007). Too many trees to see 
the forest: performance, event-related potential, and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging manifestations of integrative congenital prosopagnosia. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 19(1), 132-146. 
Bird, G., & Cook, R. (2013). Mixed emotions: the contribution of alexithymia to the 
emotional symptoms of autism. Translational Psychiatry, 3, e285. 
 Boersma, P., & Weenink, D. (2015). Praat: doing phonetics by computer [Computer 
program]. Version 6.0.08, retrieved 1  2015 from http://www.praat.org/. 
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 433-436. 
Brewer, R., Happe, F., Cook, R., & Bird, G. (2015). Commentary on "Autism, oxytocin and 
interoception": Alexithymia, not Autism Spectrum Disorders, is the consequence of 
interoceptive failure. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 56, 348-353. 
Bruce, V., & Young, A. W. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Journal of 
Psychology, 77, 305-327. 
Bukach, C. M., Le Grand, R., Kaiser, M. D., Bub, D. N., & Tanaka, J. W. (2008). 
Preservation of mouth region processing in two cases of prosopagnosia. Journal of 
Neuropsychology, 2(1), 227-244. 
Caldara, R., Schyns, P., Mayer, E., Smith, M. L., Gosselin, F., & Rossion, B. (2005). Does 
prosopagnosia take the eyes out of face representations? Evidence for a defect in 
representing diagnostic facial information following brain damage. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 17(10), 1652-1666. 
Calder, A. J., & Young, A. W. (2005). Understanding the recognition of facial identity and 
facial expression. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(8), 641-651. 
Cook, R. & Biotti, F. (2016). Developmental prosopagnosia. Current Biology, 26(8), R1-R2. 
Cook, R., Brewer, R., Shah, P., & Bird, G. (2013). Alexithymia, not autism, predicts poor 
recognition of emotional facial expressions. Psychological Science, 24(5), 723-732. 
Dalrymple, K. A., Corrow, S., Yonas, A., & Duchaine, B. (2013). Developmental 
prosopagnosia in childhood. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 29(5-6), 393-418. 
Dalrymple, K. A., Fletcher, K., Corrow, S., das Nair, R., Barton, J. J., Yonas, A., et al. 
(2014). "A room full of strangers every day": the psychosocial impact of 
developmental prosopagnosia on children and their families. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 77(2), 144-150. 
Dalrymple, K. A., Garrido, L., & Duchaine, B. (2014). Dissociation between face perception 
and face memory in adults, but not children, with developmental prosopagnosia. 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 10-20. 
Davis, J. M., McKone, E., Dennett, H., O'Connor, K. B., O'Kearney, R., & Palermo, R. 
(2011). Individual differences in the ability to recognise facial identity are associated 
with social anxiety. PLoS One, 6(12), e28800. 
De Haan, E. H., & Campbell, R. (1991). A fifteen year follow-up of a case of developmental 
prosopagnosia. Cortex, 27(4), 489-509. 
De Renzi, E., Faglioni, P., Grossi, D., & Nichelli, P. (1991). Apperceptive and associative 
forms of prosopagnosia. Cortex, 27(2), 213-221. 
 Dennett, H. W., McKone, E., Tavashmi, R., Hall, A., Pidcock, M., Edwards, M., et al. (2011). 
The Cambridge Car Memory Test: a task matched in format to the Cambridge Face 
Memory Test, with norms, reliability, sex differences, dissociations from face 
memory, and expertise effects. Behavior Research Methods, 44(2), 587-605. 
Dobel, C., Bölte, J., Aicher, M., & Schweinberger, S. R. (2007). Prosopagnosia without 
apparent cause: Overview and diagnosis of six cases. Cortex, 43(6), 718-733. 
Duchaine, B., Germine, L., & Nakayama, K. (2007). Family resemblance: ten family 
members with prosopagnosia and within-class object agnosia. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 24(4), 419-430. 
Duchaine, B., Murray, H., Turner, M., White, S., & Garrido, L. (2009). Normal social 
cognition in developmental prosopagnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 26(7), 620-
634. 
Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2006a). The Cambridge Face Memory Test: results for 
neurologically intact individuals and an investigation of its validity using inverted 
face stimuli and prosopagnosic participants. Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 576-585. 
Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2006b). Developmental prosopagnosia: a window to content-
specific face processing. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16, 166-173. 
Duchaine, B., Parker, H., & Nakayama, K. (2003). Normal recognition of emotion in a 
prosopagnosic. Perception, 32(7), 827-838. 
Duchaine, B., Yovel, G., Butterworth, E., & Nakayama, K. (2006). Prosopagnosia as an 
impairment to face-specific mechanisms: Elimination of the alternative hypotheses in 
a developmental case. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 23(5), 714-747. 
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1975). Pictures of Facial Affect. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press. 
Fine, D. R. (2012). A life with prosopagnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 29(5-6), 354-359. 
Frith, C. (2009). Role of facial expressions in social interactions. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1535), 3453-3458. 
Garrido, L., Eisner, F., McGettigan, C., Stewart, L., Sauter, D., Hanley, J. R., et al. (2009). 
Developmental phonagnosia: a selective deficit of vocal identity 
recognition. Neuropsychologia, 47(1), 123-131. 
Garrido, L., Furl, N., Draganski, B., Weiskopf, N., Stevens, J., Tan, G. C. Y., et al. (2009). 
Voxel-based morphometry reveals reduced grey matter volume in the temporal cortex 
of developmental prosopagnosics. Brain, 132, 3443-3455. 
Gomez, J., Pestilli, F., Witthoft, N., Golarai, G., Liberman, A., Poltoratski, S., et al. (2015). 
Functionally defined white matter reveals segregated pathways in human ventral 
temporal cortex associated with category-specific processing. Neuron, 85(1), 216-227. 
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed human neural system 
for face perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(6), 223-233. 
 Heaton, P., Reichenbacher, L., Sauter, D., Allen, R., Scott, S., & Hill, E. (2012). Measuring 
the effects of alexithymia on perception of emotional vocalizations in autistic 
spectrum disorder and typical development. Psychological Medicine, 42(11), 2453-
2459. 
Humphreys, K., Avidan, G., & Behrmann, M. (2007). A detailed investigation of facial 
expression processing in congenital prosopagnosia as compared to acquired 
prosopagnosia. Experimental Brain Research, 176(2), 356-373. 
Ipser, A., & Cook, R. (2015). Inducing a concurrent motor load reduces categorization 
precision for facial expressions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception Performance. 
Ishihara, S. (1993). Ishihara’s Tests for Colour-Blindness. Tokyo, Japan: Kanehara. 
Johnen, A., Schmukle, S. C., Hüttenbrink, J., Kischka, C., Kennerknecht, I., & Dobel, C. 
(2014). A family at risk: Congenital prosopagnosia, poor face recognition and 
visuoperceptual deficits within one family. Neuropsychologia, 58, 52-63. 
Kanwisher, N. (2000). Domain specificity in face perception. Nature Neuroscience, 3(8), 
759-763. 
Kennerknecht, I., Grüter, T., Welling, B., Wentzek, S., Horst, J., Edwards, S., et al. (2006). 
First report of prevalence of non-syndromic hereditary prosopagnosia (HPA). 
American Journal of Medical Genetics, 140A(15), 1617-1622. 
Kennerknecht, I., Ho, N. Y., & Wong, V. C. N. (2008). Prevalence of heriditary 
prosopagonsia (HPA) in Hong Kong Chinese population. American Journal of 
Medical Genetics, 146A(22), 2863-2870. 
Kress, T., & Daum, I. (2003a). Developmental prosopagnosia: a review. Behavioral 
Neurology, 14(3-4), 109-121. 
Kress, T., & Daum, I. (2003b). Event-related potentials reflect impaired face recognition in 
patients with congenital prosopagnosia. Neuroscience Letters, 352(2), 133-136. 
Langner, O., Dotsch, R., Bijlstra, G., Wigboldus, D. H. J., Hawk, S. T., & van Knippenberg, 
A. (2010). Presentation and validation of the Radboud Faces Database. Cognition & 
Emotion, 24(8), 1377-1388. 
Lee, Y., Duchaine, B., Wilson, H. R., & Nakayama, K. (2010). Three cases of developmental 
prosopagnosia from one family: detailed neuropsychological and psychophysical 
investigation of face processing. Cortex, 46(8), 949-964. 
Liu, T. T., & Behrmann, M. (2014). Impaired holistic processing of left-right composite faces 
in congenital prosopagnosia. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 750. 
McConachie, H. R. (1976). Developmental prosopagnosia. A single case report. Cortex, 
12(1), 76-82. 
 Minnebusch, D. A., Suchan, B., Ramon, M., & Daum, I. (2007). Event-related potentials 
reflect heterogeneity of developmental prosopagnosia. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 25(7), 2234-2247. 
Nunn, J. A., Postma, P., & Pearson, R. (2001). Developmental prosopagnosia: Should it be 
taken at face value? Neurocase, 7(1), 15-27. 
Palermo, R., Willis, M. L., Rivolta, D., McKone, E., Wilson, C. E., & Calder, A. J. (2011). 
Impaired holistic coding of facial expression and facial identity in congenital 
prosopagnosia. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 1226-1235. 
Parkinson, B. (2005). Do facial movements express emotions or communicate motives? 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9(4), 278-311. 
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: transforming 
numbers into movies. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 437-442. 
Prins, N., & Kingdom, F. A. A. (2009). Palamedes: Matlab routines for analyzing 
psychophysical data. . http://www.palamedestoolbox.org. 
Scherer, K. R. (1986). Vocal affect expression: a review and a model for future research. 
Psychological Bulletin, 99(2), 143-165. 
Schmalzl, L., Palermo, R., & Coltheart, M. (2008). Cognitive heterogeneity in genetically 
based prosopagnosia: a family study. Journal of Neuropsychology, 2(Pt 1), 99-117. 
Shah, P., Gaule, A., Gaigg, S. B., Bird, G., & Cook, R. (2015). Probing short-term face 
memory in developmental prosopagnosia. Cortex, 64, 115-122. 
Shah, P., Gaule, A., Sowden, S., Bird, G., & Cook, R. (2015). The 20-item prosopagnosia 
index (PI20): a self-report instrument for identifying developmental prosopagnosia. 
Royal Society Open Science, 2(6), 140343. 
Susilo, T., & Duchaine, B. (2013). Advances in developmental prosopagnosia research. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23, 423-429. 
Thomas, C., Avidan, G., Humphreys, K., Jung, K. J., Gao, F., & Behrmann, M. (2009). 
Reduced structural connectivity in ventral visual cortex in congential prosopagnosia. 
Nature Neuroscience, 12, 29-31. 
Todorov, A., & Duchaine, B. (2008). Reading trustworthiness in faces without recognizing 
faces. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 25(3), 395-410. 
Yardley, L., McDermott, L., Pisarski, S., Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2008). 
Psychosocial consequences of developmental prosopagnosia: a problem of 
recognition. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 65(5), 445-451. 
Young, A. W., Perrett, D. I., Calder, A. J., Sprengelmeyer, R., & Ekman, P. (2002). Facial 
expressions of emotion: Stimuli and tests (FEEST) [computer software]. Bury 
St Edmunds, England: Thames Valley Test Company. 
 
 
  Table 1: Scores of each Developmental Prosopagnosic on the Twenty-Item Prosopagnosia Index 
(PI20), The Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT), The Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), 
The Cambridge Bicycle Memory Test (CBMT), The Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT). The 
mean and standard deviation of the comparison sample (N = 35) are provided below. The z-scores 
provided for the CFPT are based on performance in the upright condition.  
 
Participant Age PI20 
CFPT 
upright 
CFPT 
inverted 
CFMT 
% 
CBMT% CCMT% 
CFMT z-
scores 
CFPT z-  
scores 
PI20 z-
scores 
F1 43 79 26 58 62.50 83.33 62.50 -2.18 -0.45 -4.16 
F2 46 61 68 58 52.78 80.56 73.61 -3.13 -4.25 -2.35 
F3 22 89 30 70 50.00 77.78 52.78 -3.40 0.00 -5.16 
F4 42 92 62 82 45.83 94.44 65.28 -3.81 -3.58 -5.47 
F5 70 95 100 92 36.11 - 76.39 -4.76 -7.83 -5.77 
F6 40 85 40 82 40.28 59.72 63.89 -4.35 -1.12 -4.76 
F7 50 78 34 52 58.33 91.67 86.11 -2.59 -0.45 -4.06 
F8 21 59 30 64 63.89 75.00 - -2.04 0.00 -2.15 
F9 29 68 32 58 61.11 - 63.89 -2.31 -0.22 -3.06 
F10 63 79 40 70 61.11 80.56 66.67 -2.31 -1.12 -4.16 
F11 53 85 74 94 45.83 88.89 63.89 -3.81 -4.92 -4.76 
F12 65 81 44 78 59.72 93.06 66.67 -2.45 -1.57 -4.36 
M1 47 92 86 54 51.39 98.61 94.44 -3.26 -6.26 -5.47 
M2 46 72 50 64 66.67 90.28 76.39 -1.77 -2.24 -3.46 
M3 68 92 92 78 27.78 70.83 47.22 -5.57 -6.94 -5.47 
M4 43 78 52 50 58.33 94.44 93.06 -2.59 -2.46 -4.06 
M5 28 62 46 60 62.50 77.78 69.44 -2.18 -1.79 -2.45 
TD mean 40.48 37.35 29.40 60.00 85.00 83.22 61.45    
TD SD 13.31 10.75 9.48 14.47 8.48 12.26 13.15    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Performance of the Developmental Prosopagnosics (DPs) and the typically 
developing controls (TDs) used in Experiments 1-3 on The Cambridge Face Memory Test 
(CFMT), The Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT), and The Twenty-Item Prosopagnosia 
Index (PI20).  
 
 
DPs 
 
TDs (Experiment 1) 
 
TDs (Experiment 2) 
 
TDs (Experiment 3) 
 
M SD 
 
M SD contrast 
 
M SD contrast 
 
M SD contrast 
CFMT 53.18 10.94 
 
83.68 9.94 p < .001 
 
83.13 10.25 p < .001 
 
83.41 10.34 p < .001 
CFPT 53.29 23.22 
 
32.48 8.48 p < .010 
 
32.67 7.39 p < .010 
 
32.24 9.38 p < .010 
PI20 79.24 11.52 
 
37.05 9.52 p < .001 
 
36.95 9.60 p < .001 
 
38.05 9.88 p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Correlations between the expression categorisation thresholds observed in Experiment 1 and 
participants’ scores on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), the Cambridge Face Perception 
Test (CFPT), the 20-item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20), the Cambridge Car Memory Test (CCMT) and 
the Cambridge Bike Memory Test (CBMT). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CFMT CFPT PI20 CCMT CBMT 
 
r p r p r p r p r p 
Happiness-anger -.23 .16 .24 .14 .08 .62 .00 .99 -.19 .29 
Disgust-sadness -.22 .19 .33 .04 .27 .09 .05 .80 .02 .92 
Fear-surprise -.57 < .001 .78 < .001 .51 < .001 .00 .98 -.03 .88 
Mean threshold -.46 .004 .61 < .001 .35 .03 .02 .92 -.13 .46 
 Table 4: Correlations between the expression recognition accuracies scores observed in Experiment 2 
and participants’ scores on the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT), the Cambridge Face 
Perception Test (CFPT), the 20-item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20), the Cambridge Car Memory Test 
(CCMT) and the Cambridge Bike Memory Test (CBMT).   
 
 
CFMT CFPT PI20 CCMT CBMT 
 
r p r p r p r p r p 
70% (high intensity) .39 .01 -.55 <.001 -.44 .007 -.01 .97 .02 .90 
50% (moderate intensity) .49 .002 -.52 .002 -.56 <.001 .01 .95 .10 .58 
30% (low intensity) .36 .03 -.46 .005 -.29 .12 -.05 .77 .17 .35 
Overall performance .48 .002 -.58 < .001 -.48 .003 -.02 .93 .11 .54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: (a) Morphed expression stimuli used in Experiment 1. (b) Mean categorisation thresholds 
for the three continua exhibited by the typical observers and the developmental prosopagnosics. Error 
bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. (c) Scatter plot of the relationship observed between 
participants’ scores on the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT) and their thresholds for the Fear-
Surprise categorisations. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Figure 2: (a) Single-case analysis of the surprise-fear thresholds observed in Experiment 1. (b) 
Single-case analysis of the overall performance observed in Experiment 2. Error bars represent ± 1 
standard deviation. * denotes performance < 1 standard deviation below the TD mean; ** denotes 
performance at least 2 standard deviations below the TD mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Figure 3: (a) Examples of the eye-region stimuli used in Experiment 2. (b) The mean recognition 
accuracy exhibited by the typical observers and the developmental prosopagnosics in the three 
emotion intensity conditions. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
